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Abstract
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution
as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of prob-
lem we consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable
permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the
ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation
to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to
achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to
distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the
permits which rises with the exchange of the permits.
Keywords -nonpointsourcepollution,ambienttax, tradablepermitsmarket.
1 Introduction
Nonpointsource pollution is characterized by the fact that individual emis-
sions cannot be controlled at a reasonable cost. Hence the failure of tradi-
tional economic instruments (taxes, standards, tradable permits markets)
to solve this type of problem. Indeed, one cannot differentiate the tax and
the standard according to the characteristics of each agent; furthermore one
cannot dissuade an agent from free-riding when a tradable permits market
is applied because an agent’s individual contribution to ambient pollution
is not identiﬁable. Consequently, the inobservability of individual perfor-
mances in the case of nonpoint source pollution induced the economists to
consider instruments based on collective performance (ambient pollution).
However, the heterogeneity of the agents implied in nonpoint source pol-
lution deteriorates the effectiveness of ambient mechanisms as it poses the
1problem of the distribution of abatement levels between these agents.
To solve the problem of moral hazard resulting from nonpoint source pol-
lution, Meran and Schwalbe [3] and Segerson [5] propose a system of col-
lective incentives based on the difference between the level of total pollu-
tion measured at a given site and a standard of maximum pollution ﬁxed
in advance. These ambient mechanisms were supported by several exper-
imental studies ([4], [7] and [1]) which showed the effectiveness of such
approaches to achieve the depollution goal.
However, the heterogeneity of the agents responsible for nonpoint source
pollution affects the economic effectiveness of this mechanism. Indeed, as
the regulator cannot know the individual abatement level that an agent
must support, he cannot achieve the depollution goal at a lower cost. One
of the possible solutions to control this type of asymmetry is the implemen-
tation of a decentralized economic instrument. Instead of seeking informa-
tion, one lets the farmer reveal it through the market of tradable permits.
The advantage of this solution, compared to a standard, appears when the
regulator does not have sufﬁcient information on individual emissions and
this cannot differentiate the standard according to each agent’s character-
istics. In this case he sets a total standard of ambient pollution and lets the
market ﬁx the individual emissions levels. This correspondsto a transfer of
strategy from the regulator towards the polluters - a decentralized instru-
ment.
In this article we designa tradable permits market associated to an ambient
tax in the event of non-compliance to a pre-determined standard. On the
one hand, the role of the tax is to ensure that the agents will provide the
necessary collective abatement level to achieve the total depollution goal.
On the other hand, the market for tradable permits has the role of effec-
tively distributing this collective abatement level between the agents. The
permit price which emerges from the exchanges is the standard of distribu-
tion of the abatement level.
Segerson and Wu [6] also used a nonpoint source pollution control instru-
mentassociatedtoa threatifthedepollutiongoalis notachieved. Theseau-
2thors proposeda voluntary mechanism of nonpoint source pollution abate-
ment, however, if the depollution goal is not achived then the regulator
engages in costly information seeking about individual emissions. In fact,
Segersonand Wu [6], make the assumption that the damage caused by pol-
lution is higher than the cost of follow-up and control of the individual
emissions. Contrary to Segerson and Wu [6], in this article we assume that
the cost of control and follow-up of the individual emissions is prohibitory
and/or impossible to implement.
This article is organised as follows. In section 2, we solve the group moral
hazard issue characteristic of nonpoint source pollution, by determining
the level of the ambient tax that agents will face if the ambiant norm is not
respected. Then in section 3, we solve the adverse selection problem by
designing a tradable permits market that induces the agents to reach the
depollution goal at the lowest cost. Then in section 4 we discuss the results
and provide some concluding remarks.
2 Group moral hazard
Thefact that individual emissionsare notobservable while collective pollu-
tion (ambient pollution) is, is a typical case of group moral hazard. Holm-
str¨ om [2] analyzed group moral hazard in teams. However, the ﬁrst to
have mobilized the collective mechanisms for the management of nonpoint
source pollution are Meran and Schwalbe [3] and Segerson [5]. These au-
thors proposed an incentive scheme of collective tax/subsidy based on the
difference between a level of total pollution measured at a given site and a
maximum pollution standard ﬁxed in advance. Several experimental stud-
ies showed the effectiveness of such instruments to achieve a depollution
goal ([4], [7] and [1]). However, what comes out of these studies it is that
the mechanism of collective tax/subsidy may even induce the agents to
over-abate. In what follows we approach agricultural nonpoint source pol-
lution as a group moral hazard issue, and deﬁne the appropriate ambient
tax.
We consider a catchment where are located n agents whose individual
emissions cannot be observed by the regulator. Let Z be the total ambient
3pollution emitted by the agents and measured at the outset of the catch-
ment. This ambient pollution is easily observable and measured by the reg-
ulator. It originates exclusively from the activities of the agents located in
the catchment. Let gi(zi) the output function of the agent i and zi the pollu-







< 0. The individual pollution
is given by Zi(gi(zi),ai) with
n X
j=1














< 0. Without any
pollution regulation policy, the abatement of the agent i is ai = 0. So, the
upper bound of the pollution function results in Zi(gi(zi),0) = Zi(gi(zi))
Inordertolimit pollution, theregulatorenforcesanambient pollutionstan-
dard ¯ Z, exogenous to the model. For instance, it can represent a health or
ecological standard. Once the standard is established, the regulator an-
nounces to the agents contributing to the ambient pollution that if the stan-
dard is exceeded they will all be taxed according to the difference between
observed ambient pollution Z and the ambient standard ¯ Z. The ambient





τi(Z − ¯ Z) if Z > ¯ Z,
0 otherwise
with τi the individual tax rate.
At this stage, an agent i’s individual programe is:
max
zi,ai
πi = sgi(zi) − ci(gi(zi),ai) − τjE[
n X
j=1
Zj(gj(zj)) − ¯ Z]
With, s the output price, g(), the production vector, c(), the cost function
and a, the abatement vector.
The random part of the individual program E[
X
j
Zj(gj(zj)) − ¯ Z] repre-
sents the uncertainty about the other agents’ actions. Indeed, this expres-
sion can also be written as
4X
j
Zj(gj(zj)) − ¯ Z = Zi(gi(zi)) +
n−1 X
k=1
Zk(gk(zk)) − ¯ Z,
with k 6= i, where
n−1 X
k=1
Zk(gk(zk)) is not under agent i’s control.
Let ϕi be agent i’s probability regarding compliance to the pollution stan-
dard and 1 − ϕi the probability that the standard is not respected (and the
tax is applied). Agent i’s proﬁt becomes:
max
zi,ai
πi = sgi(zi) − ci(gi(zi),ai) − (1 − ϕi)τj(
n X
j=1
Zj(gj(zj)) − ¯ Z)
The regulator seeks to deﬁne the tax rate τ that prevents any free-riding
attempt, and thus guarantees compliance with the standard (ϕ = 1). The
regulator doesn’t know the marginal abatement costs but she knows that a
tax rate τi > c0
i(ai),∀i prevents free-riding by implying ϕ = 1.
Although the procedure is not optimal, by imposing a tax rate higher than
the marginal abatement cost by any agent, the regulator knows that he will









Zk(gk(zk),ak) = ¯ Z (λ)
Li = sgi(zi) − ci(gi(zi),ai) + λ(Zi(gi(zi),ai) +
n−1 X
k=1











































The last equation gives us the marginal abatement cost. However agent i
only knows his abatement costs and does not have any means of know-
ing the shadow abatement costs λk, k 6= i of the other agents. So even if
he wants to comply, agent i does not know the abatement ai that he must
provide. In orderto overcome this lack of information, the regulator imple-
ments a tradable permits market. Indeed, this instrument has the potential
to equalize the marginal abatement cost with the price, inducing the agents
to abate optimally.
3 Tradable permits market
As the group moral hazard issue is solved, we are interested in the distri-
bution of the abatement level between the agents, knowing that no agent
knows the marginal abatement costs of the other agents.
In the case of nonpoint source pollution, the information asymmetry be-
tween the regulator and the farmer is the main issue. One of the possible
solutions to control this type of pollution is the implementation of a decen-
tralized economic instrument. Instead of seeking information, one lets the
farmer reveal it through a tradable permits market. The advantage of this
solution compared to the standard is apparent when the regulator does not
have sufﬁcient information on maximum emissions for each agent. In this
case he sets a total standard of ambient pollution and lets the market ﬁx the
levels of individual emissions. This corresponds to a transfer of strategy
from the regulator towards the polluters.
6Intheir initial version, it was proposedto introduce the permits via a mech-
anism of bidding. This implies a high initial cost for the agents. This cost
can be reduced by proposing a free allowance to the agents. The regu-
lator sets a pollution standard and distributes the corresponding number
of permits. The agents exchange the permits between them. Those whose
marginal abatement cost is lowerthan the price of thepermits, forthe num-
ber of permits which were allocated to them, will sell their surplus to those
who have a deﬁcit of permits. A rule of allowance must however be de-
ﬁned. The authors genrally favour the grand-fathering rule where the al-
lowance depends on historical levels of emissions. Several studies showed
that if the market is competitive, an effective equilibrium is reached what-
ever the initial allowance [8]. Moreover, assuming that all the agents mini-
mize their costs, a well-deﬁned tradable permits market could allocate the
permits effectively, and imply compliance to the ambient pollution goal, in
spite of an incomplete information structure about the various control pos-
sibilities of the regulator [8].
In this article we propose a market associated to an ambient tax, speciﬁed
as follows:
Let x0




j = ¯ x, with, Z(¯ x,A) =
¯ Z. A is the collective abatement level that all agents have to provide to















i > 0 the agent i is a buyer
If xe
i < 0 the agent i is a seller















< 0 the agent i is a seller
The market is competitive and the permits price p is exogenous to agent i.










































































































) − p + µi = 0
As the market is competitive, at the equilibrium the shadow cost of ex-
changed permits µi equalizes the permits price p, i.e., as long as µi 6= p



























At the equilibrium the marginal abatement costs of the whole of the agents




= p, agent i does not have any incentive to free ride. Indeed,
in our case the free riding is assimilated to the save of the abatement cost.
Then, apply a tax rate equal to the marginal abatement cost cancels any in-
terest to free ride.
Hence this model can be analyzed as a two-step mechanism:
at t = 0: the regulator distributes pollution permits to the agents accord-
9ing to a well identiﬁed method, such that
Pn
j=1 x0
j = ¯ x. This method will
such be that it reﬂects the most the heterogeneity between the agents. He
imposes thereafter a conditional tax on the agents, tax that will depend on
the level of ambient pollution x. If the ambient pollution standard ¯ x is ex-
ceeded at the end of period t = 1, then the regulator applies an ambient tax
τi(x − ¯ x), with tax rate τi. If the standard is not exceeded, then the game
proceeds to the following stage.
at t = 1: the agents exchange permits according to the market price which
emerges by confronting the marginal abatement costs of the agents. At
the end of period t = 1 the regulator observes ambient pollution x. If the
standard is respected at the end of period t = 1, then the regulator deﬁnes
a new rate of tax τi = p and returns to period t = 0 with a conditional tax
of the form p(x − ¯ x). If the ambient standard is exceeded, then the game
returns to period t = 0 with a conditional tax of the form τi(x − ¯ x).
4 Conclusion
This article deals with the management of nonpoint source pollution as
a group moral hazard issue. In order to solve this problem we designed a
two stages mechanisms that combines two instruments : a tradable permits
market and an ambient tax. The tax acts as a threat that will be applied in
case of non-compliance to a pre-determined ambient pollution standard.
The market then makes it possible to effectively distribute the abatement
level between the agents through the quantity of permits and the price.
Segerson and Wu [6] also designed a mechanism combining two instru-
mentsto manage nonpointsourcepollution: a voluntary-based instrument
associated to a tax if the standard is exceeded. However, the threat pro-
posed by these authors rests on an investment which makes it possible to
measure individual emissions and thus design individual tax rates. Such
an investment can prove very expensive.
We adopted another approach which rests on an intial high tax. Although
this type of tax is not optimal, it makes it possible to guarantee compliance
to the ambient pollution standard. Furthermore, the correct operation of a
10permit market leads to a permit price equal to the marginal abatement cost.
At the second stage of the mechanism, it is the equilibrium price which will
be taken as the tax rate in the event of non-compliance with the standard.
However, as the permit price is equal to the marginal abatement cost, no
agent will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to free-ride. Contrary to the mechanism devel-
oped by Segerson and Wu [6], instead of investing to measure the individ-
ual emissions, we leave the market reveal it.
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